European Union, Mediterranean region and energy issue by Kouzmine, Yaël & Chanard, Camille
European Union, Mediterranean region and energy issue
Yae¨l Kouzmine, Camille Chanard
To cite this version:
Yae¨l Kouzmine, Camille Chanard. European Union, Mediterranean region and energy issue.
49th european congress of the Regional Science Association International : ”Territorial cohesion
of Europe and integrative planning”, Aug 2009, Lodz, Poland. <halshs-00675978>
HAL Id: halshs-00675978
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00675978
Submitted on 2 Mar 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
European Union, Mediterranean region and energy issue 
 
 
Yaël Kouzmine - PhD in geography 
yael.kouzmine@toulouse.inra.fr 
Laboratoire AGIR UMR 1248 – INRA Toulouse/INP-ENSAT 
 
Camille Chanard - PhD in geography 
camille.chanard@univ-fcomte.fr 






The energy issue is an essential factor of economic development. Moreover, since the World 
War II, it is one of the bases of European Union political genesis. Nowadays, the debate about 
the cooperation process between European Union and Mediterranean countries is partly 
focused on the energy issue. On the one hand, European energy dependency is raising, on the 
other hand, most of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries are economically 
dependent on their hydrocarbon exports. In this context, a new European energy policy 
emerged in the 90’s structured by three main principles: 
  energy dependency requires to diversify the geographic origins of the energy imports; 
  renewable energies have to be developed due to the environmental issue and to the 
increasing prices of fossil fuels;  
  create an European energy market, which could become an Euro-Mediterranean one.  
These elements lead to the emergence of a new cooperation between Europe and the other 
Mediterranean countries. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership project launched in 2007 could 
be a political framework able to facilitate this new form of governance. Energy issue is a 
pertinent thematic to analyse territorial coherence and stakes of sustainable development in 
the Euro-Mediterranean region. 
In the first part, we will demonstrate the historical role of energy issue in European Union 
emergence. In the second part, we will present European initiatives in energy area which tend 
to include the other Mediterranean countries. Finally, we will discuss about energy stakes in 
the region and territorial differences between northern and southern coasts 
Key-words: Energy issue, Energy policies, Sustainable development, Europe, 
Mediterranean region, Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. 
Introduction 
 
Energy represents one of the bases of the European Union construction since the end of the 
World War II, and is today in the middle of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. In a context 
of fossil resources depletion and energy consumptions increasing, the energy interdependence 
between Mediterranean countries is more and more obvious. The hydrocarbon reserves of the 
North Sea become exhausted quickly, while the economies of the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) depend mainly on the receipts oil and gas exports. 
Structural deficit of energy offer and European dependence on external suppliers, 
Mediterranean or not, caused partly a political reactivation of the process of cooperation 
within the Euro-Mediterranean region, in order to diversify the energy provisioning and to 
manage in the long term the energy market safety. The Euro-Mediterranean political 
framework, outlined since 1995, saw its energy dimension reinforced because of the new 
European policies since the end of the 1990s. If the concerns are directed fossil energies, 
renewable energies, solar one in particular, have to play in the future a more important part in 
the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean energy partnership. 
The Mediterranean Solar Plan was announced on 13 July 2008 at the Paris Summit for the 
Mediterranean region in order to develop renewable energy production, in particular solar 
technologies, on the southern side of the Mediterranean. Main objectives are, on the one hand 
to encourage the local production in order to satisfy demand at local level, and on the other 
hand, to increase export to Europe and consequently to diversify the European energy 
consumptions. These prospects would require a technology transfer to the South. 
The EU having any interest to support the development of this type of energy: to achieve its 
ambitious goals of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, in the one hand, and to increase 
proportion of renewable energies in its consumption, on the other hand. 
Between environmental urgency and energy supply acuity, construction of a 
Euro-Mediterranean energy area seems a possible and relevant way of regional dialogue. The 
energy interdependence of the Mediterranean countries could then evolve to a cooperation 
articulating Community concerns and individual ambitions of the States. 
In the first part, we will demonstrate the historical role of the energy issue in the European 
Union emergence. In the second part, we will present the European initiatives in energy field, 
which tend to include the other Mediterranean countries. Finally, we will discuss about the 
energy stakes in the region (consumptions, productions, supplies and dependences) and 
territorial differences between northern and southern coasts. 
 
1. European construction and energy 
1.1. The beginnings 
 
Energy field always constituted a discussion thread to all the treaties and process of European 
political construction. As Keppler (2007) affirms: “The founding fathers of modern Europe 
had understood that the Union would be a union of energy or would not be”. 
Thus, the first step of the European Union was the signature of the Treaty of Paris on 
18 April 1951 which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) “based on 
a common market, common objectives and common institutions” (article 1). One of the 
objectives of this treaty was to create a convergence of interests between ex-belligerents 
through raw materials (coal and iron ores) necessary to the rebuilding and to the economic 
dynamism after the World War II. 
The second European Treaty directly relating with energy field created the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom). It was established on 25 March 1957 along with the European 
Economic Community (EEC) by the Treaty of Rome. Euratom directly integrated economic 
and political dimensions of the energy question in the construction of a supranational entity. 
With a civil and peaceful vocation, it was thought like the tool which can make possible the 
reduction of the European energy dependence in a context of oil consumption increase and of 
geopolitical instability to the Middle East (Crisis of Suez of 1956). 
 
1.2. The new energy policies in Europe 
 
The permanent tensions on the energy market - prices hike, anticipation of “peak oil”, energy 
supply problems, geopolitical situation in the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America - 
cumulated with increasing environmental concerns - Summits of the Earth in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992 and Johannesburg in 2002, Protocol of Kyoto in 1997 (Lamy, 2006) - considerably 
reinforce the energy question within the Community policies since the 2000. 
Facing this reality, the European Commission Green Papers on energy in 2000 and 2006 
begin debate and ring the alarm bell about the European energy dependence and its impact on 
the economic growth. Green Papers propose priority areas in order to overcome the structural 
deficit of the energy production in EU; all the more deficit will be increasing because of 
European Union expansion, which will integrate countries more consumers than energy 
producers. Energy dependence on imported energy was evaluated in 2000 to approximately 
50% of the European requirements - figure which could reach 70% by 2030. In 1999, “it costs 
the Union some EUR 240 billion, or 6% of total imports and 1.2% of the GNP” (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2000).  
The European strategy to reduce the dependence, or all at least to maintain it on a reasonable 
level, rests on two objectives: on the one hand, an action on the offer by diversifying the 
various sources of supply (by product and by geographical region), and developing 
endogenous energies, of which renewable energies and, on the other hand, policies to control 
consumption (change of the behaviors). In addition, the establishment of a common and 
concerted policy is now in question: to harmonize practices in EU, to reinforce Union’s 
influence on the international scene in negotiation about energy field, in particular in event of 
crisis or increased tensions on the markets. The structural weakness of economic and political 
pressure at the international scale, as well as the absence of common instruments, increase 
EU dependence and vulnerability in the strategy for security of supplies, more especially as 
“the risk of rupture of the international supply, [in particular] oil ones, certainly increased 
these ten last years” (Noël, 2006). 
Whereas the Green Paper adopted in 2000 underlines risks correlated with energy dependence 
(economic, social and environmental), Green Paper released in 2006 priories action areas. The 
main objective is the construction of a European energy market, in order to guarantee the 
security of supply and to “ensures solidarity between Member States”; to diversify the energy 
mix by the development of renewable energy for “tackling climate change”; to encourage 
innovation; and to put in place a “coherent external energy policy” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006). Recognizing the decisive role of energy dimension in the 
process of European construction and in the strict continuity of the principles emerged during 
the preceding phase of consultation, the elements for a new “energy policy for Europe” were 
presented in 2007 (Rosseti di Valdalbero, 2008). Beyond the main measure previously 
exposed, the objectives posted by the European Commission are particularly ambitious. At 
environmental level, “the European Parliament gave its backing to the EU's climate change 
package [in December 2008] to ensure that the EU will achieve its climate targets by 2020”: 
20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 20% improvement in energy efficiency and 20% 
share for renewables in the EU energy mix1 (European Parliament, 2008). One priority of the 
French EU Presidency was to manage an agreement between all Member States on these 
whole measures, before end-2008 (Delcour, 2008) and the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Poznań in 2008 and then in Copenhagen in 2009. 
In foreign policy, EU has also large ambitions: creation or reaffirmation of the relations with 
bordering countries (Turkey, Ukraine); strengthening bonds with principal energy suppliers 
(Russia, OPEC, GCC2, Central Asia countries or Brazil for biofuel); establishment of an 
African-European partnership on the energy field; and, finally, improvement of interactions 
with others world's largest consumer (USA, China, India). All these European provisions will 
have however to take into account past or in progress initiatives in direction of the 
Mediterranean countries, which take part of reorganization of the political and energy stakes 
on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
 
2.  The construction of a Euro-Mediterranean energy partnership 
 
2.1. The political framework: Barcelona Process 
 
The Barcelona Process aims to establish a new relational framework between the 
European Union and Mediterranean countries. It constitutes the heritage of the political 
orientations followed by Council of the European Union, as well as the European 
Commission proposals in the beginning of the 1990s. Ratified in 1995 in Barcelona, the 
process then included the fifteen States of the EU, including three new members at 1st January 
1995 (Austria, Sweden and Finland), and twelve countries of the Mediterranean region (fig.1). 
                                                 
1 Year of reference for reductions remains to be solved (it will be  a priori 1990, as for the Kyoto Protocol). 
2 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an economic and political policy-coordinating forum for the six 
member tates (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). 
Thus, this partnership concerned very heterogeneous States from the geographical point of 
view, with economic, social and political specificities. 
Final Declaration of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of 27 and 28 
November 1995 establishes “a multilateral framework bringing together economic and 
security aspects and also comprises a social, human and cultural dimension”. Three keys 
sector composed the Euromed partnership. First focused on the emergence of “a common area 
of peace and stability” founded on the respect of human rights. The second insists on the 
creation of a “an area of shared prosperity” in the Mediterranean Basin, passing by the 
introduction of a free trade area, the development of an economic cooperation and “a 
substantial increase in the European Union's financial assistance to its partners”. Finally, the 
third sector concerns cultural, social and human exchange, with the objective to “bring 
peoples closer together, promote understanding between them and improve their perception of 
each other” (Council of the European Union, 1995). 
Fig. 1  Evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
The Barcelona process allowed the constitution of an area for political dialogue between 
countries of the Mediterranean Basin. Periodic meetings of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
are organized, in spite of the very complex and tended geopolitical context in the region. 
Construction of this area of dialogue differs from the regional integration led in the Maghreb 
since 1989 (Arab Maghreb Union), which has never been really efficient (Troin and al, 2006).  
According to a recent report, assets of Barcelona Process concern three fields (Mediterranean 
Institute, 2007). The first is the interest of non-EU Mediterranean Countries, of which 
Germany and of new Member States, for the political process, but also for the economic 
potential. Second point is the evolution of institutions “which seems irreversible” in SEMCs. 
Finally, on the security aspect, fight against traffic and terrorism, cooperation was reinforced 
significantly within Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
Nevertheless, beyond the construction of a political exchange framework and in spite of 
number assets, the results are thin regarded as ambitions posted in 1995. Indeed, the 
North-South economic divide is still relevant today. Disparities, as regards of richness 
creation, remain significant. The average GDP per capita in Europe were established in 2005 
to EUR 28 300, and was only of EUR 8 733 for the whole SEMCs, and even lower if Israel is 
exclude. Thus, in spite of the integration of SEMCs into the global economy, the economic 
growth differences and social change between countries and within the Mediterranean 
countries are still present. During the period 2000-2006, the average economic growth at 4% 
in the EuroMed zone “was not sufficient to reduce the structural deficit” (Bauchard, 2008). 
Moreover, relative weakness of direct investments abroad, which move mainly towards the 
“traditional income sectors” (real, oil and tourism), did not allowed a total economic 
convergence of Euro-Mediterranean space (Beckouche and Guigou, 2007). Finally, the 
relative share of the European investments in Mediterranean space decrease then, at the 
contrary, the United States and the Gulf States tend to intensify their investments. 
The economic divide also results in unemployment variations between North and South of the 
Mediterranean. The rate within the UE-27 reached 7.1% of the population in 2007, whereas it 
can exceed 10-15% in certain SEMCs. In addition Alain Le Roy (2008), quoting OECD, 
estimates that “considering demographic pressure in the southern shores of the Mediterranean, 
it would be appropriate to create approximately 40 million jobs in the fifteen next years, to 
maintain the same employment rate”. Taking into account demographic situation and 
economic growth, economic situation will probably not improve radically in the long term. 
Concerning cultural and human exchanges, access to Schengen space becomes more and 
more difficult. Mobility between Mediterranean shores, in particular South-North influx, is 
not so easy, in spite of historical regional interactions. This aspect confirms the functional 
non-integration between Europe and “its South”. 
On the political level, in spite of significant evolutions and institutional reforms, the great 
majority of the SEMCs remains controlled by authoritative regimes, not very inclined to a real 
democratic opening. On the other hand, the area and its peripheries directly undergo the 
multiple consequences of 11 September 2001: Iraq conflict, bilateral American 
interventionism for prevention of terrorism, etc. (Noël, 2006). Detractors of the Barcelona 
Process moreover criticized the heaviness of the new institutions created and the lack of 
articulation with the European neighbourhood policy (Mediterranean Institute, 2007). 
Thus, after ten years, the “multilateral framework based on a spirit of partnership” created to 
stimulate the emergence of a “common area of peace, stability and prosperity through the 
reinforcement of political dialogue and security, an economic and financial partnership and a 
social, cultural and human partnership” (European Union, 1995) in the Mediterranan Basin, 
did not bear its fruits. European voluntarism to cooperate with Mediterranean partners 
continues in 2000 with the adoption of the EU Common Strategy for the Mediterranean. This 
strategy “pursues cooperation between the EU, the Mediterranean region and Libya in a vast 
range of areas” (European Union, 2000a). If it does not propose new elements in the 
European action in direction of Mediterranean partners, this strategy confirms nevertheless 
the increase of political cooperation and economic exchange. 
The relations between EU and Mediterranean partner countries on the energy filed thus began 
formalized with the installation of the Barcelona Process in 1995, liked with the wish to found 
a free trade area in the Mediterranean Basin. The regular organization of Euro-Mediterranean 
ministerial conference on energy, as the creation of a euro-Mediterranean forum on this field 
marks the installation of a regional political dialogue on energy. 
 
2.2. Union for the Mediterranean: new perspectives? 
 
In the continuity of Barcelona Process, the project of Union for the Mediterranean (UFM), 
initiated and supported by the President of the French Republic Mr. Sarkozy and his special 
advisor Mr. Guaino, clearly aims to restructure cooperation in the Mediterranean. This project 
is based on the relaunch of regional political dynamics and a restoration of the strategic 
objectives with partner countries. Evoked by Nicolas Sarkozy in February 2007, the 
emergence of the UFM project at the end of the year 2007 was marked by the French 
President speech in Tangier on 23 October 2007. President Sarkozy then did not hesitate to 
reaffirm that the future of Europe is played in South, and that “in turning the back on the 
Mediterranean, Europe would be cut not only of its intellectual, morals, spiritual sources, but 
also of its future. Because it is in the Mediterranean Basin that Europe will gain its prosperity, 
its safety, that it will find the Founding Fathers’ impulse”. Fifty years after the Treaties of 
Rome signature, and referring to the Europe Founding Fathers, the French President launches 
the concept of Union in order to build a new political experiment in the Mediterranean area. 
The reception of this proposal by the European countries was at the very least mitigated: 
Germany fearing the emergence of major divisions within the EU and, more prosaically, the 
exclusion of its companies of the process; Spain fearing Barcelona Process disappearance to 
which it particularly attached. As for the SEMCs, they “in their majority, expressed an 
interest for the project” (Bauchard, 2008). However, some reserves were expressed by Turkey 
which saw an attempt to impose a substitute on its request for EU adhesion (Schmid, 2008) 
and by Libya which, in spite of recent changes in the geopolitical plan (Saint John, 2008), 
perceived the project like a new form of imperialism and refusing the idea of an union with 
Israel. 
These political criticisms led to a new formalization of the project in the Rome Call launched 
jointly by Spain, France and Italy on 20 December 2007. The Call stipulates that Barcelona 
Process and European neighbourhood policy “will remain central in the partnership between 
the European Union as a whole and its Mediterranean partners”, the UFM will have to “give 
them an extra boost seeking to complement and work in cooperation with all the existing 
institutions” (Présidence de la République Française, 2007b). Turkey and Croatia were 
assured that this new process should not interfere in the adhesion negotiations: the future 
Union for the Mediterranean is founded on a principle of cooperation and not of integration. 
The project receives the German approval after modification and a Franco-German agreement 
was signed on 3 March 2008, making possible integration of the whole European States in the 
project. This agreement opened the way with acceptance of the project by the Council of 
the EU now called: “Process of Barcelona: Union for the Mediterranean” (fig.1). Following 
the European Council of 19-20 June 2008, negotiations were engaged with all the countries 
called to be members of the UPM, “to preparing a joint declaration to be adopted at the Paris 
Summit for the Mediterranean on 13 July 2008” (European Union, 2008a) which gathered the 
whole candidates States. The objective is to find a “new shared governace” and “to increasing 
solidarities through concrete projects of regional size” (Présidence de la République 
Française, 2008a).  
 
2.3. Towards an institutionalization of the European energy partnership? 
 
Since 2000, elements show the reinforcement of the Euro-Mediterranean interactions around 
the energy area. On 29 May 2006, the Council of the European Union approved the Energy 
Community Treaty. It aims to create an integrated market of energy, natural gas and 
electricity, between the EU, six Balkan countries, Bulgaria and Romania (then candidate 
countries for accession to the EU). Moreover, today, five States have the Observer status 
(figure 2). This treaty explicitly aims “to promote High-Levels of gas and electricity provision 
to all citizens based on public service obligations, and to achieve economic and social 
progress” in a context where the 1990s conflicts dismantled the distribution networks in 
Balkans. It also facilitates the energy opening-up of Greece, encouraging the “connections to 
Caspian, North Africa and Middle East gas reserves”, and includes a “the coordination of 
mutual assistance in case of serious disturbance to the energy networks or external 
disruptions” (European Union, 2006). Beyond, we can consider the intrinsic geopolitical 
aspect of the pipelines which can represent “the vectors of a mystic unit and peace” (Simonet, 
2007) in this area. 
In the energy field, this first cooperation extended to Mediterranean partners is registered in 
parallel of a “new Euro-Mediterranean energy partnership” inaugurated at the 5th Euro-
Mediterranean Energy Ministerial Conference on 17 December 2007 in Limassol (Cyprus). 
The conference gathered 35 countries, including 24 Europeans, 10 Member States of the 
future Union for Mediterranean,  as well as Croatia with Observer status; it should be noted 
the absence of Libya to the negotiating table, however major actor of gas and oil production 
in the area.  
European Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, with Ministers from the EU Member States 
and from the Mediterranean partner countries, endorsed the Priority Action Plan for Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation. Three main areas was defined, “harmonization of energy markets 
and legislations”, promotion of “sustainable development in the energy sector” and finally 
development of “initiatives of common interest in key areas, such as infrastructure extension, 
investment financing and research and development” (European Union, 2007). One of the 
main objectives of Limassol Conference is the development of infrastructures and networks 
for North-South and South-South supply. Thus, first partnerships aim a diversification of 
fossil fuel supplies and electricity supplies for the EU, and facilitating political dialogue and 
investments in the Mediterranean Basin. The UFM project in the energy field completes 
Energy community Treaty and Limassol Conference.  
 
Fig. 2  The energy issue and the EuroMediterranean Partnership 
Gathering majority of the States taking part in the preceding mechanisms, “Barcelona 
Process: Union for the Mediterranean”, also integrates energy under the priority fields of 
action. However, actions are not yet really clear, and at the present time we can only outline 
some elements relating to renewable energies. Thus, a “Mediterranean Solar Plan” was 
launched in 2008. It has three principal aims: to supply Europe in energy, to increase the 
production of a low-carbon electricity, to answer the consumption increase in SEMCs, taking 
into account the demographic and economic growth (Presidency of the French Republic, 
2007). The project would make possible, on the one hand, preservation of the fossil reserves, 
and consequently perpetuation of export earnings for producer countries (Algeria, Egypt…) 
and, on the other hand, reduction of the energy dependence in the Mediterranean Basin, by 
supporting regional interactions. Moreover, development of a low-carbon energy in the 
Mediterranean Partner Countries exported to the North could allow the EU, not to achieve, 
but to approach the European goals of a 20% share of energy from renewable sources by 
2020, as well as the Kyoto objectives. The real solar potential, although marginally exploited 
at the present time, is nevertheless recognized (Harouadi and Al, 2007; Alnaser and Al, 2004) 
and could in the long term constitute a local and convenient resource  to tackle energy 
demand increase in SEMCs. 
However, if these elements propose an interesting prospective vision, the current energy 
system in the Mediterranean Basin remains founded on the massive use of fossil fuels. 
Interstate relations are largely based on this field. An analysis of dependences and interactions 
around energy within the Mediterranean Basin can partly explain the construction of a 
Euro-Mediterranean energy area. 
 
3. Energy stakes in Euro-Med: North-South complementarities 
 
3.1. Fossil fuels 
 
Energy is one of the “key sectors” of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, because there is an 
“obvious complementarity between two sides of the Mediterranean” (Chevallier, 2008), in 
particular for fossil energies but also for renewable energies. Indeed, all the European 
countries are strongly or completely dependent on the hydrocarbon imports, except United 
Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands which are producer countries. On the other hand, 
North African countries are mainly exporters (fig. 3). This situation is all the more 
problematic as “even in the most optimistic conditions, Europe will have to buy at least 
10 million barrels of oil and approximately a billion cubic meters of gas per day on the 
international market” (Keppler, 2007).  
Although projections envisage for 2025 an energy growth rate “four times higher in the 
Southern and Easter Mediterranean countries than in the North, linked with economic 
development and increasing population needs” (UNEP, 2006), principal poles of consumption 
are today mainly located in Europe. In 2007, EU countries accounted almost 95% of total 
UFM oil consumption and 90% of gas consumption; but produced 32,2% of total UFM oil 
productions and in 56,1% of gas (BP, 2008). Thus, even if the majority of the European 
countries do not have fossil resources, energy dependence of the EU is more related to the 
high level of consumption than to the low level of production. 
Fig. 3  Energy interdependence in the Mediterranean Basin 
Indeed, sum of natural gas productions in the European Union is higher than the production in 
countries of Southern side of the UFM (191.9 against 129.5 billion cubic meters per day), 
while oil productions are almost equivalent (2 394 thousand of barrels per day for the EU, 
2 808 thousand of barrels per day for the Mediterranean partners). But oil and gas European 
reserves, mostly in North Sea, are much less important than those of the South: 0,5% of world 
oil proved reserves and 1,6% of world gas proved reserves in 2007 are in UE, whereas it 
respectively accounts for 1,3% and 3,7% in the African part of the UFM.  Moreover, we assist 
at the progressive exhaustion of European reserves. Exploitable gas reserves of United 
Kingdom, the most important EU hydrocarbon producer, passed 640 billion cubic meters 
in 1987 to 770 billion in 1997 (after new discoveries) and then fall to 410 billion in 2006. At 
the current rate, it remains 5.7 years after a stop of exploitation. EU gas reserves follow the 
same tendency (3 850 billion cubic meters in 1997 against 2 940 in 2007) and, at the current 
exploitation rate, fifteen years of production are estimated (BP, 2008).   
Thus, dependence on South should increase, whereas question of durability and balance 
between consumption and production, which already arises today, will grow-up in the long 
term. Indeed, in the totality of the UFM countries, gas consumption accounts for 18.4% of 
world gas consumption, for 11.6% of production and for 6.4% of proved reserves. This 
observation is even more alarming for oil: 18.9% of world consumption; 8.8% of production 
and 5.2% of world proved reserves. 
We only considered in table n°1 UFM countries, but if Libya is integrated, balance changes 
considerably. Indeed, gas production is not very important (15.5 billion cubic meters), but 
more than half is exported to EU (Eurostat, 2008). Moreover, Libya is an important oil 
producer (2.2% of the world oil production). Sum of the Algerian, Egyptian and Libyan oil 
productions, represents twice the European production and cumulated reserves of these three 
countries, oil and gas, constitute almost twice the whole African reserves. On the whole, these 
three countries have approximately 5% of the world hydrocarbon reserves (BP, 2008). 
                  
  OIL in 2007 production consumption proveded reserves   
















  Total Middle East 25176 30.8% 6203 7.4% 755.3 60.9%   
  Total Middle East without UFM 24782 30.3% 6203 7.4% 752.8 60.7%   
  Total UFM Middle East  393.9 0.5% - - 2.5 0.2%   
  Total Africa 10318 12.5% 2955 3.5% 117.5 9.2%   
  Total Africa without UFM 5662.2 7.1% 2034.1 2.4% 59.1 4.7%   
  Total UFM Africa 4655.5 5.4% 921.1 1.1% 58.4 4.5%   
  Total Europe (UE 27) 2394 2.9% 14861 17.8% 6.8 0.5%   
  TOTAL UFM 7443.9 8.80% 15782.0 18.89% 66.9 5.2%   
           
           
  NATURAL GAS in 2007 production consumption proveded reserves   













total   
  Total Middle East 355.8 12.1% 299.4 10.2% 73.21 41.6%   
  Total Middle East without UFM 350.5 11.9% 298.4 10.2% 72.921 41.5%   
  Total UFM Middle East 5.3 0.2% - - 0.288 0.2%   
  Total Africa 190.4 6.5% 83.5 2.8% 14.58 8.3%   
  Total Africa without UFM 45.6 1.5% 27.1 0.9% 6.51 3.7%   
  Total UFM Africa 144.7 4.9% 56.4 1.9% 8.07 4.6%   
  Total Europe (UE 27) 191.9 6.5% 481.9 16.4% 2.84 1.6%   
  TOTAL UFM 341.9 11.59% 538.4 18.37% 11.2 6.36%   
           
  Source:  BP, 2008, Statistical review of world energy    
  
We consider that countries counted like "Other Middle East" and "Other Africa" in BP statistical don't participate in UFM                               
(explaining differnces in consumption).   
Tab. 1 Oil and gas in the Euro-Mediterranean region 
Considering natural gas more specifically, EU depends mostly on three supplier countries: 
Russia, Norway and Algeria (fig.4). Indeed, gas transportation by pipeline requires a relative 
geographical proximity and a geopolitical stability to allow the realization and the security of 
infrastructures. This European dependence concerns and weakens importing countries as 
much as producer-exporter ones, which are competing and must be ensured the outlets for 
their production. For example, Algeria exports more than 60% of its gas production to Europe 
(BP, 2008; Remme and al, 2008) and 95% of his currency resources come from oil and gas. 
On another side, importing countries want to diversify supplier countries in order to safe their 
supply, “central factor for energy safety being the degree of diversity of the world offer” 
(Copinschi and Noël, 2005). 
Fig. 4  The European gas supplying 
 
In this context, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation should offer safety and diversity for 
European supply and guarantee outlets for Mediterranean gas. Several projects of underwater 
gas pipelines for connecting Europe to Africa are envisaged. Thus, the Declaration of the 
5th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Energy (Limassol, 2007) proposes “to 
facilitate the financing of energy infrastructures and taking all appropriate actions in view of 
the realization of interconnection and infrastructures projects of common interest to the 
region”. These projects include in particular the installation of Maghreb-Europe gas pipelines 
(GME, Medgaz and Galsi) and of a Trans-Saharan gas pipeline (TSGP) which would make 
possible Nigerian oil import for Europe via Algeria. If the Nabucco gas pipeline project 
succeeds, Qatar, probably Iran and Caspian Sea could become, in the long term, major 
suppliers of the European market (fig. 5). 
Fig. 5  The Euro-Mediterranean network of gas pipelines 
 
3.2. Renewable energies 
 
Even if fossil fuels constitute in the present day the fundamental base of the energy 
consumption in the Euro-Mediterranean countries, UFM intends to durably support renewable 
energies development in the Mediterranean Basin. This determination, theoretical for the 
moment, answers to rarefaction and price increase of fossil energies. All the more that prices 
of these non-renewable resources will inevitably increase, whatever operating costs. Thus, 
renewable energies development represents more than an ethical choice, but a real alternative. 
In 2006, consumption of renewable energies (hydraulic, geothermic, solar and wind) in the 
Mediterranean Basin were estimated at approximately 3% of the primary energy supply, with 
respectively 3.1% for the northern countries and 2.6% for the SEMCs (UNEP, 2006). The 
Blue Plan (a UNEP Program) recently worked out two prospective scenarios on the energy 
evolution in Mediterranean Basin. The first scenario considers continuity in States and 
companies strategies working in the region, and bases the analysis on a perspective of offer 
increase. The second, with voluntarism orientation, imagines a common political will for a 
rational energy use, in order to “increase the energy system effectiveness” and develop 
renewable energies. Development of these energies (solar, wind, geothermic and small 
hydraulic) and “use of technologies already available” on the market, could lead to a 20-25% 
decrease in energy demand, and more in the SEMCs. Moreover, “renewable energies share in 
energy balance could approach 14%” as against 3% in the present day (UNEP et al., 2006). 
In addition, the Blue Plan noted that “the international cooperation [in the Mediterranean] to 
bring energy consumption under control and to develop renewable energies production” was 
characterized by “a multitude of isolated projects without a strong structuring capacity in the 
long term” (UNEP et al., 2006). Diversity of national situations among SEMCs, as well as 
political basic divergences, are important obstacles for the realization of large scale projects, 
such as Mediterranean Solar Plan envisaged by the UFM. Nevertheless, bilateral North-South 
projects are developing, sometimes to the detriment of South-South projects. But attitude of 
SEMCs concerning development of renewable energies is very variable and largely depends 
on their energy resources. For example, Morocco which 90% depends on the imports for its 
energy supply already installed, at the beginning of the 2000s, a wind park between Tétouan 
and Tangier. This park constitutes the largest installation of Africa and supply 400 000 people 
for the electric consumption.  
On the contrary, Algeria and other producer countries do not feel the urgency to develop this 
type of installations. Nevertheless, cooperation with Germany led the emergence of two 
significant projects. The first aims to build a gas-solar hybrid power station in the area of 
Hassi R'Mel in the north of the Algerian Sahara. The second, the Adrar-Aachen project, 
proposes the export of solar energy from the Algerian Sahara (area of Adrar) to Europe via 
Sardinia via high-voltage direct-current lines (HVDC). This project could generate a 10-15% 
reduction in transport losses. This action for solar energy is in the line of DESERTEC project, 
which aims to connect the whole of the Euro-Mediterranean countries to a supergrid for the 
transmissions of solar power. However, at the present time, solar energy is mainly used for 
rural electrification in the SEMCs. Costs for building of big solar power station remain still 
high, although solar energy can become competitive by 2020. 
Perhaps Union for the Mediterranean, as well as the other mechanisms of cooperation on the 
energy question, will help the necessary development of the renewable energies use. 
Moreover, and in spite of the weak productive and industrial integration of Mediterranean 
Basin (Beckouche and Guigou, 2007), renewable energies can constitute, in the long term, a 
dynamic market, involving European companies and southern operators, for the benefit of the 
populations as regards employment and energy costs. But, getting these projects underway 




The progressive construction of a Euro-Mediterranean energy area is in line with a changing 
context of regional political stakes in the Mediterranean Basin. Economic and political divide 
remain real and persistent between northern and southern shores. Strong European political 
integration contrasts with the failure of the concrete realization of the Arab Maghreb Union 
and with the political fragmentation of the Middle East. Moreover, the GDP per capita 
differentials, far from reabsorbing, accentuates cleavages between Mediterranean States. The 
various bridge-building attempts since the 1990s variable succeed, but they provided 
foundations for a political dialogue, in the absence of an efficient regional cooperation. 
Tensions remain multiple and geopolitical balances evolved, with the assertion of the foreign 
actors’ role such as United States or Persian Gulf States, which invests financially or 
strategically this area.  
In the concert of geopolitical changes, Euro-Mediterranean dialogue was reaffirmed recently 
whereas energy field shows well reciprocal stakes and interdependences between States of the 
Mediterranean Basin. Moreover, with the fossil resources rarefaction and the increase of 
consumption, energy field was reinforced into the Community policies and takes an active 
part in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. Barcelona Process, Community of energy and Union 
for the Mediterranean concretely integrate this dimension and could help EU to play a 
structuring role in the region, contrary to traditional action “of the United States in the Persian 
Gulf which is equivalent to a “negative authority”: aiming to prevent certain actions, more 
than to determine positively the future of the area” (Noël, 2008). Energy sector, beyond 
inevitable economic interdependences, can constitute a “common interest in the long term” 
(Bauchard, 2008). It can make possible to find a Euro-Mediterranean consensus, in particular, 
on the renewable energies field in a context of rarefaction of the European hydrocarbon 
reserves. Thus, renewable energies can, on the one hand represent a local response to a 
consumption increasing on the southern shore, and on the other hand take part in the 
diversification of the European energy supply. Moreover, the market of renewable 
technologies should constitute a considerable economic income for European industries, and a 
technology transfer to the South. This aspect could, in the long term, redefine energy relations 
in the Euro-Mediterranean region, and redraw the “energy dependence” map with the 
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